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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1960
over them seems to stem more from tribal inertia than from hostility
to state jurisdiction. Until the legislature acts affirmatively to assert
jurisdiction over the Indian Tribes, situations such as those presented
in the Adams and Starlund cases will continue to arise in Washington.
A large number of Indians will continue to be without the protection
of the state's courts. LEON MISTEREK
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Suspension or Revocation of a Driver's License by Police Courts.
The Washington Supreme Court recently announced that no police or
municipal court may suspend a Washington State driver's license for
violation of a municipal ordinance.
In City of Bellingham v. Schampera,1 defendant Schampera was
charged and convicted in the Bellingham police court of driving while
under the influence of intoxicants in violation of a city ordinance sub-
stantially similar3 to RCW 46.56.010. He appealed to the Whatcom
County Superior Court where a trial de novo was had. He was con-
victed, fined $100 and sentenced to ninety days in the county jail. His
driver's license was suspended for 6 months.
On appeal, Schampera argued that the state, by enacting RCW
46.56.010, had pre-empted the field of legislation with respect to
drunken driving; that a municipality was without power to suspend
or revoke a state driver's license for violation of a municipal ordinance;
and that the Bellingham ordinance was invalid because the punishment
provided thereunder was in excess of that allowed by law to be assessed
by a municipal or police court. The court held against Schampera's
first and third contentions but for him on the second.
With respect to the third contention, the Bellingham city ordinance
provided:
Upon the first conviction for the violation of the provisions of this
section [one of which prohibits driving on the public highways while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor] the court shall impose a fine
of not less than fifty dollars or more than five hundred dollars and not
less than five days or more than one year in jail, and shall in addition
1 157 Wash. Dec. 1, 356 P.2d 292 (1960).
2 BFLLINGUAM, WASH., CODE § 18.56.100 (1955).
8 The ordinance forbade drunken driving and was, in its penalty provisions, a
verbatim copy of RCW 46.56.010.
4
"Though the appeal results in a trial de novo, the charge is still the violation of a
municipal ordinance, and the superior court's authority is specifically limited on such
an appeal by RCW 35.22.560... [$300 fine and/or ninety days imprisonment]." City
of Bellingham v. Schampera, 157 Wash. Dec. 1, 11, 356 Pl2d 292, 299 (1960).
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thereto, suspend the operator's license of such person for not less than
thirty days .... 5
RCW 35.22.4706 limits the power of a municipality to the imposition
of a $300 fine and/or ninety days imprisonment for violation of city
ordinances.
Although the sentence imposed upon Schampera was within the
statutory limits (exclusive of the suspension of his operator's license,
which is treated below), the defendant urged that that sentence could
not be imposed because the quoted ordinance was void. The alleged
invalidity arose out of the conflict between the maximum penalty pro-
visions of the statute and the excess of the ordinance penalty provisions
over that maximum. The issue thus defined was the validity of a city
ordinance which provides a minimum penalty ($50 and/or five days)
which is less than the statutory maximum ($300 and/or ninety days),
but whose maximum penalty ($500 and/or one year) exceeds the
statutory maximum.
In resolution of this issue, one of first impression, the court said:-
There is a division of authority on this question, but we adopt the
majority and, we believe, the preferable rule: that an ordinance which
authorizes a penalty in excess of that permitted by statute is not void,
and a sentence pronounced under such an ordinance may be enforced
to the extent that it is within statutory limitations, if the city's legisla-
ture would have enacted the ordinance knowing that only the lesser
penalties could be imposed. (Emphasis added.)
That the unitalicized portion of the rule above is the majority rule is
undeniable.' That the italicized portion of the rule above is the ma-
jority rule is unsupportable.'
The variance between the majority rule and that used by the court
is pointed out neither for criticism nor analysis but merely to draw
attention to its existence. Should the occasion again arise which calls
5 BELLINGHAM, WASH., CODE § 18.56.100 (1955).
6 Wash. Sess. Laws 1923, c. 182, § 1: "That any city of the first class shall have
power by ordinance to provide for the punishment of all disorderly conduct, and of
all practices dangerous to the public health or safety, and to make all regulations
necessary for the preservation of public morality, health, peace and good order within
its limits; to provide for the arrest, trial, and punishment of any person charged with
violating any of the ordinances of said city; to provide for the imposition by police
judges of a fine not to exceed three hundred dollars ($300), or imprisonment not to
exceed ninety (90) days, or both such fine and imprisonment."
7 City of Bellingham v. Schampera, 157 Wash. Dec. 1, 13, 356 P.2d 292, 300 (1960).
8 See cases cited in 37 Am. JUR. Municipal Corporations § 164 (1941) ; Annot., 138
A.L.R. 1208; 62 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 178, 354 (1949).
9' Kist v. Butts, 71 N.D. 436, 1 N.W.2d 612 (1942), the case cited by the court in
support of the rule, provides no such authority, nor do the cases cited therein. See
also note 8 supra.
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for use by the court of the rule adopted, one of three things will hap-
pen: the court will adopt the additional requirement by pointing out,
as it did in the instant case,1" that the municipality has enacted previ-
ous ordinances on the subject and, therefore, that the legislative intent
is clear; or the court will second-guess the municipal legislative body;
or the variation will be eliminated by the court. In view of the court's
announced intention to uphold municipal regulations whenever pos-
sible,1 the last alternative would seem to be preferable.
Also worthy of brief note are the standards used by the court in
disposing of Schampera's first contention that the state has taken over
the field of drunken driving legislation generally. Looking, routinely
enough, to the legislative intent in adopting RCW 46.56.010 (the
drunken driving statute), the court, finding no exclusionary intent on
the face of the statute, perceived no pre-emptive intent. Looking then
to ascertain whether the Bellingham ordinance was "pre-empted," i.e.,
invalid, because of conflict with RCW 46.56.010, the court, citing Salt
Lake City v. Kusse, 2 approved and used'3 the following test for de-
termining whether or not a conflict existed:
In determining whether an ordinance is in "conflict" with general
laws, the test is whether the ordinance permits or licenses that which
the statute forbids and prohibits, and vice versa.... judged by such a
test, an ordinance is in conflict if it forbids that which the statute per-
mits ....
Attention is drawn to the court's use of this test because the Washing-
ton court has not previously stated the rule so concisely. Numerous
decisions" can be found, however, which attest the use of very similar
criterion. In fact, none has been found which bespeaks use of a
different standard.
Schampera's second contention on appeal, and the only one which
the court accepted, was that a municipality is without power to provide
for the suspension or revocation of a driver's license for violation of a
city ordinance. Because of the important and practical considerations
raised by the court's acceptance of this contention, it deserves a more
detailed treatment.
1o City of Bellingham v. Schampera, 157 Wash. Dec. 1, 13, 356 P.2d 292, 300 (1960).
"See e.g. Sandona v. City of Cle Elum, 37 Wn.2d 831, 840, 226 P2d 889, 892
(1951).1297 Utah 113, 119, 93 P.2d 671, 675 (1939).
1" City of Bellingham v. Schampera, 157 Wash. Dec. 1, 6, 356 P.2d 292, 296 (1960).
14E.g., Fazio v. Eglitis, 54 Wn.2d 699, 344 P.2d 521 (1959) ; Lauterbach v. City of
Centralia, 49 Wn.2d 550, 304 P.2d 656 (1956) ; City of Yakima v. Gorham, 200 Wash.
564, 94 P.2d 180 (1939).
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The court's rationale in handling this problem may be summarized
as follows: The state constitution grants a municipality the power to
"make and enforce ... all such local police... regulations as are not
in conflict with general laws."15 "General law"'" has limited the en-
forcement power of the municipality to imposition of a $300 fine
and/or imprisonment for ninety days for violation of a municipal
ordinance. Therefore, without a specific grant of authority from the
legislature, a municipality cannot revoke or suspend a driver's license
for violation of a municipal ordinance.
The court further reasoned that RCW 46.08.190, which provides
that a "police court judge shall have concurrent jurisdiction with
superior court judges of the state for all violations of the provisions
of this title and may impose any punishment provided therefor," does
not contain a special grant of authority to municipalities to suspend
or revoke a driver's license for violation of a municipal ordinance alone
because the "provisions of this title" refers to state laws, not city ordi-
nances. Therefore, RCW 46.08.190 does not modify RCW 35.22.470."
The court also failed to find a specific grant of power to police judges
to suspend or revoke licenses in RCW 46.20.280.18 Although that sec-
tion contains an apparent grant of power, the court pointed out' that
the codification does not conform to the session laws. Citing an opinion
of the Washington Attorney General,2" the court thought the session
law was ambiguous and declined to give it any effect.
Except for the last mentioned holding, the court's rationale is un-
impeachable. The entire rationale is unimpeachable if the premise is
accepted that the session law is ambiguous. The finding of ambiguity
is, however, subject to serious question. RCW 46.20.280 reads:
Every court having jurisdiction over any of the offenses defined by
this chapter or any other law of this state or by the ordinances of any
city or town regulating the operation of vehicles on the public high-
ways, shall forward to the Director a record of the conviction or for-
feiture of bail of any person in such court for the violation of any
provision of law relating to the licensing of vehicle operators or of any
law regulating the operation of vehicles on the public highways, and a
record of the conviction or forfeiture of bail of any person for the
violation of any municipal ordinance which violation would also be an
15 WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
16 RCW 35.22.470.
17 Ibid.
18 Wash. Sess. Laws 1939, c. 182, § 10.
19 City of Bellingham v. Schampera, 157 Wash. Dec. 1, 9-10, 356 P2d 292, 298
(1960).
201941-42 Ops. WAsH. ATT'Y GEN. 229.
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offense under the provisions of law relating to the licensing of vehicle
operators or of any law regulating the operation of vehicles on the
public highways. In such latter case the court nay also revoke or
suspend the vehicle operator's license of the defendant. (Emphasis
added.)
Chapter 182 Section 10 of the Laws of 1939 reads:
Every court having jurisdiction over any of the offenses committed
under this act or any other act of this state or under the ordinance of.
any incorporated city or town of this state regulating the operation of
vehicles on any of the-public highways, shall fofward'to the Director
of Licenses a record of the conviction or of forfeiture of bail by any
person in said court for the violation of any provision'relatirig to the
licensing of vehicle operators or of any -act of this state regulating the
operation of vehicles on any of the public highways and a record of the,
conviction of or forfeiture of bail by any person in said, court for the
violation of any municipal ordinances which violation would also be
an offense under the provisions relating to the, licehsing of motor
vehicle operators or any act of this state regulating the operation of-
vehicles on any of the public highways in which case sudh court may
in its discretion revoke or suspend the vehicle operator's license -of
such person.
As pointed out by the court, the italicized portion of RCW 46.20.280
does not conform to the session law. Admittedly, the session law. is
poorly drafted, but the codifier's reading of the law, as evidenced by
the slight variation indicated, seems to be a true and reasonable codifi-
cation of the law.
The issue can be somewhat clarified by taking only so much of the
session law as is pertinent to the power of a municipality to suspend
or revoke a driver's license. The law then reads:
Every court having jurisdiction over any of the offenses committed
under.., the ordinance of any incorporated city or town of this state
regulating the operation of vehicles on any of the public highways shall
forward to the Director of Licenses... a record of the conviction of
or forfeiture of bail by any person in said court for the violation of
any municipal ordinances which violation would also be an offense
under the provisions relating to ... any act of this state regulating the
operation of vehicles on any of the public highways in which case such
court may in its discretion revoke or suspend the operator's license of
such person.
Read in this manner, the session law may more easily be seen to
allow every court to revoke or suspend a driver's license where the act
with which the licensee is charged violates both a municipal ordinance
and the state law. Where such a dually violative act is committed, the
1961]
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court must forward a record of the conviction or forfeiture of bail,
whether or not the court suspends or revokes the driver's license. Thus
the commission of the dually violative act not only allows the revoca-
tion or suspension of the license, but requires the sending of a report
to the Director of Licenses. This section is thus seen to complement
RCW 46.08.190 (the concurrent jurisdiction provision). The latter
section allows municipal courts to revoke or suspend licenses for viola-
tion of state laws. This section allows municipal courts to do likewise
where the violation of the municipal ordinance is also a violation of
state law.
Under the attorney general's interpretation of the law, which the
court accepted, it is not the commission of the dually violative act
which occasions the permissive use of the extraordinary power but
rather the fact that the court was required to send a report to the
Director."' That the power of suspension or revocation should be
available to the court merely because the court is required to make a
report to the Director is called an absurdity by the assistant attorney
general and by the court. But is it not the interpretation and not the
law which is absurd?
A well-known canon of statutory construction calls for that inter-
pretation of a legislative enactment which gives meaning and effect to
all the provisions thereof. Furthermore, in Sandona v. City of Cle
Elum2 the court said that "It is only in extreme cases that courts
limit the police power of a municipal corporation; and this is particu-
larly true in such a case as is here presented, where it appears that the
ordinance was enacted for the protection of the city and its inhabitants
against an ever-present danger."
It would seem that the codifier's interpretation of the act, which
gives it meaning and vitality, is to be preferred over the attorney
general's, which renders it a nullity. Yet, it must be pointed out that
the court has not foreclosed itself from adopting the former interpreta-
tion in some circumstances. The court held: "We are satisfied that
neither RCW 46.56.010 nor RCW 46.20.280 gives any authority to a
police court to suspend a motor vehicle operator's license as a penalty
for a violation of a municipal ordinance. ."'I The court did not hold
that these sections do not grant the power of suspension or revocation
where the defendant is charged with both the violation of a municipal
21 Ibid.
2237 Wn.2d 831, 840, 226 P.2d 889, 892 (1951).
23 City of Bellingham v. Schampera, 157 Wash. Dec. 1, 10, 356 P.2d 292, 298-99
(1960).
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ordinance and of a state law. The court dealt only with the situation
where the defendant is charged with violation of a municipal ordinance
alone. When the proper case arises, i.e., one in which the defendant
is charged in municipal court with both violations, the court may hold
that under these circumstances a police court can, upon conviction of
either charge, revoke or suspend a driver's license under RCW
46.20.080.
In summary, the present status of the law is that a municipal court
cannot revoke or suspend a motor vehicle operator's license upon
conviction of violation of a municipal ordinance alone under either
RCW 46.56.010 or RCW 46.20.280. A municipal court can suspend
a license upon conviction of violation of a state statute regulating use
of the highway under RCW 46.08.190. Where the defendant is
charged and convicted of violation of a municipal ordinance, and the
same act done by the defendant is violative of both an ordinance and
a state statute, but no charge is made based upon the statute, the
Schampera case must be taken to say that the municipal court cannot
revoke or suspend the driver's license. Where the defendant is charged
with the violation of both an ordinance and a statute, but is convicted
only of the violation of the ordinance, it is an open question whether
or not a municipal court can deprive him of his driver's license.
C. DAVID SHFPPAU
PLEADING, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE
Abolition of the Show Cause Order. Are Washington practitioners
wasting their own time and their clients' money? It may be that some
are by following procedure not contemplated by the new Rules of
Pleading, Practice, and Procedure.
This observation is occasioned by the recently decided case of
Dlouly v. Dlouhy.1 The case arose out of a petition to vacate a default
divorce decree taken by the wife. The petition was grounded upon
lack of notice.
Upon initiating the proceedings, the wife obtained, ex parte, a tem-
porary restraining order prohibiting the husband from selling or en-
cumbering the property, and an order directing the husband to show
cause why the restraining order should not be converted to a temporary
injunction pendente lite, and why he should not be ordered to vacate
the home. No answering affidavits were entered, but on the return day
55 Wn2d 718, 349 P2d 1073 (1960).
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